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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The title of my talk today is the “the future of public funding,” 
and I am tempted to say “there’s not much future” for public funding.  
The 2012 presidential election marked the first time since the 
presidential public funding law was enacted in 1974 that neither 
major party presidential candidate accepted public funding in the 
general election and the first time that no significant contender for a 
major party nomination accepted public funding in the primary phase.  
Congressional public funding appears dead in the water.  In the last 
Congress, public funding proposals were referred to House and 
Senate committees, where they promptly died.  In the current 
* Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School.  This article was 
presented at the Willamette University College of Law Symposium on Campaign Finance and 
the 2012 Election on February 8, 2013. 
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Congress, three bills were introduced in the House of Representatives, 
but there is little reason to expect action on them.  The dramatic rise 
in independent spending through Super PACs and 501(c) 
organizations in the last two election cycles significantly undermines 
the prospect that public funding can achieve its traditional goals—
ameliorating the burdens of fundraising, promoting fair competition 
among candidates, and reducing the role of private wealth on 
elections and governance.  At the state and local level, a number of 
states and cities have adopted effective public funding programs.  But 
many of these systems were impaired, and some scrapped outright, 
due to the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Arizona Free Enterprise 
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett 1 striking down the so-called 
“trigger” provision of Arizona’s public funding law.  Indeed, Arizona 
Free Enterprise is likely to be a barrier to the effectiveness of public 
funding laws and, as a result, a disincentive to the adoption of such 
laws. 
On the other hand, the future of public funding may be 
considered bright—or relatively bright—because public funding is the 
only form of campaign finance reform that is both constitutionally 
available and likely to have any impact on how we fund our elections 
and on how our election funding affects governance.  Citizens United   
2 makes it absolutely clear—if it wasn’t before—that expenditure 
limits are not constitutionally available—whether for candidates, 
corporations, or any other campaign participants.  Although Citizens 
United also makes it clear that contribution limits and disclosure 
remain constitutionally available, they are not likely to have much 
impact.  After SpeechNow 3 and similar court of appeals’ decisions, 
not only is independent spending unlimitable, but also donations to 
committees engaged in independent spending are unlimitable.  In the 
last election cycle we saw nominally independent committees formed 
to support a specific candidate, operated by individuals previously 
affiliated with the candidate and aided by candidates soliciting funds 
for those committees, air messages closely tracking those of the 
candidate.  Under these circumstances, limits on contributions to 
candidates and even limits on contributions to groups that give to 
candidates seem increasingly beside the point.  The Supreme Court 
has strongly endorsed disclosure, but the emergence of nominally 
1.  131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
2.  Citizens United v. FEC, 588 U.S. 310 (2010). 
3.  SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (2010). 
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nonelectoral committees not subject to disclosure laws as major 
campaign players undermines the effectiveness of existing disclosure 
requirements.  Even if those laws can be strengthened, it is unclear 
whether and to what extent disclosure constrains the powerful 
influence of large donors on elections and governance, which has 
long been a driving concern behind campaign finance reform. 
So, weakened as it is by Arizona Free Enterprise, public funding 
remains the only game in town.  Indeed, after Citizens United, 
SpeechNow, and the rise of Super PACs and 501(c)’s, its importance 
is greater than ever.  But what we can expect public funding to do and 
how we design our public funding laws will have to change.  It is no 
longer possible—if it ever was—for public funding to take private 
funding out of elections, to limit campaign spending, or to equalize 
resources among candidates.  It is not clear whether these were ever 
desirable or attainable goals within our political system.  They are 
certainly not attainable now.  But public funding can still be used to 
lower the barriers to political entry for challengers and political 
newcomers; to reduce, even if not eliminate, the burdens of 
fundraising; to reduce, even if not eliminate, unequal funding among 
candidates; to increase the role of small donors and diversify the 
donor base; and to reduce, although not eliminate, the role of big 
money in our politics.  With scaled down expectations, public funding 
has a vital role to play in our campaign finance system. 
In my comments today, I want to briefly trace the development 
of the law of public funding in the United States, assess the impact of 
the Arizona Free Enterprise decision on public funding, and discuss 
the options for public funding after Arizona Free Enterprise. 
II.  THE ORIGINS OF PUBLIC FUNDING 
In his Seventh Annual Message to Congress on December 3, 
1907, President Theodore Roosevelt proposed what he acknowledged 
was a “very radical measure”—public funding of election campaigns.  
Roosevelt had previously called for both a federal disclosure law and 
restrictions on corporate campaign contributions, and Congress had 
adopted a corporate contribution ban when it passed the Tillman Act 
earlier in 1907.  But Roosevelt warned that merely imposing limits 
would not be enough to reform campaign finance.  “[L]aws of this 
kind,” that is, regulations of private campaign money, “from their 
very nature are difficult of enforcement,” Roosevelt observed, and, 
thus, posed the “danger” that they would be “obeyed only by the 
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honest, and disobeyed by the unscrupulous, so as to act only as a 
penalty upon honest men.”  “Moreover,” he continued, “no such law 
would hamper an unscrupulous man of unlimited means from buying 
his own way into office.”  Public financing would solve the problem 
of evasion of contribution limits and directly address the power of the 
wealthy.  “The need for collecting large campaign funds would 
vanish,” Roosevelt urged, “if Congress provided an appropriation for 
the proper and legitimate expenses” of political campaigns.  
Roosevelt was not seeking to cut back on campaign spending.  
Indeed, he urged that the appropriation be “ample enough to meet the 
necessity for thorough organization and machinery, which requires a 
large expenditure of money.”  But if an “ample” appropriation were 
made, public funding could provide a more effective reform than 
limiting large private contributions and requiring disclosure.4 
Roosevelt conceded that “it will take some time for people so to 
familiarize themselves with such a proposal as to be willing to 
consider its adoption.”5  He was certainly right about that.  The first 
bill proposing public funding of federal elections was not introduced 
into Congress until a half-century after his 1907 Message.  It took 
another decade for the idea to be taken seriously by Congress, and 
when Congress acted, it limited public funding to presidential 
elections.  Public funding has made more progress at the state and 
local level—some fifteen states have some form of public funding for 
candidates for some offices—with Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, and 
Minnesota providing public funding for legislative candidates as well 
as candidates for statewide office, and North Carolina and West 
Virginia targeting judicial elections.6  An additional ten states provide 
funds to political parties, although these tend to be very modest 
sums.7  In 2009, fourteen local governments, including New York 
City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Austin, and Albuquerque, also 
operated public funding programs.8 
4.  Theodore Roosevelt, Seventh Annual Message, December 3, 1907, available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29548. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Public Financing of Campaigns: An Overview, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/public-financing-of-camp
a igns-overview.aspx (last updated Jan. 23, 2013).  As this article was going to press, North 
Carolina was on the verge of repealing its public funding law. See Matthew Burns, Senate 
backs sweeping elections bill, WRAL.COM (July 24, 2013), http://www.wral.com/senate-backs
-sweeping-elections-bill/12699232/. 
7.  NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 6. 
8.  Jessica A. Levinson & Smith Long, Mapping Public Financing in American 
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III.  WHAT EXACTLY IS PUBLIC FUNDING? 
Public funding is a capacious concept.  It could mean any use of 
public resources to provide funds to, or to reduce the campaign costs 
of, candidates or political parties.  This could include tax credits or 
tax deductions for campaign contributions; public assumption of some 
of the costs of campaigning, such as voter registration; governmental 
publication and dissemination of voter pamphlets in which candidates 
or parties can insert campaign messages; and in-kind assistance, such 
as free postage for campaign mailings, free use of public rooms or 
schools for campaign meetings, free billboards for the display of 
campaign messages, and, most importantly, free or reduced cost 
access to radio and television for campaign advertisements.  But in 
American campaign finance parlance, “public funding” refers to the 
direct provision of public funds—or as public funding opponents like 
to emphasize, tax dollars—to candidates or political parties to be used 
for campaign purposes.  In all existing American public funding 
programs, payment is made by the government directly to qualifying 
candidates or political parties.  Several academics have proposed 
plans in which the government would give the voters campaign 
vouchers—like food stamps—which they could send to the candidates 
of their choosing, who would redeem them at the Treasury for 
money.9  No jurisdiction in the United States has adopted such a 
voucher plan. 
Even when limited to cash payments to candidates or parties, 
public funding programs exhibit considerable variation.  Indeed, 
every public funding program requires the resolution of multiple basic 
questions, including: Is the money paid to candidates or parties? 
Which elections are covered? Which candidates (or parties) are 
eligible to receive public funds? How much do they get, and how is 
that calculated? What conditions apply? Where does the money come 
from? With no two programs answering these questions in exactly the 
same way, the permutations are substantial.  But a few generalizations 
can be made. 
Elections, CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES (Jan. 2009), http://policyarchive.org/handle/10
207/bitstreams/95926.pdf. 
9.  See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW 
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002); Richard Hasen, Clipping Coupons for 
Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1 (1996). 
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A.  Candidates or Parties? 
Most public funding programs in the United States involve 
payments to candidates, not parties.  This distinguishes American 
programs from public funding around the world, which generally 
focuses on political parties.  The American approach reflects the 
candidate-centered nature of our contemporary election campaigns.  It 
is also consistent with the major role played by internal party 
elections—that is, party primaries—in selecting party nominees.  It 
would be difficult for a party-centered public funding system to 
finance candidates in internal party primaries.  At the federal level, 
the presidential public funding program provides the parties with 
funds to cover the costs of their national nominating conventions, but 
the parties are not given any money for campaign expenses. 
B.  Which Elections? 
Public funding programs vary in the scope of their electoral 
coverage.  At the federal level, the only election covered is the race 
for president.  Similarly, some states also focus exclusively on the 
election for chief executive.  Other states provide funds for candidates 
for other statewide elective offices.  North Carolina’s program 
initially provided funds only to judicial candidates;10 judicial 
elections were also the focus of West Virginia’s pilot public funding 
program.  Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, and New York City provide 
public funds to candidates for legislative office as well as statewide 
office.  A separate question is whether public funding should be 
available only in the general election or also in party primaries.  
Recognizing the central role that party primaries play in the American 
political process and the fact that in many one-party jurisdictions the 
party primary can be the only real election, most American public 
funding systems subsidize candidates in both primaries and general 
elections. 
C.  Who Qualifies? 
In most elections, there are many candidates who qualify for a 
place on the ballot but who are unlikely to engage the attention of a 
significant portion of the electorate.  To avoid wasting taxpayer 
dollars on such marginal or “frivolous” candidates, all public funding 
10.  As this article was going to press, North Carolina was on the verge of repealing its 
public funding program for judicial elections. See supra note 6. 
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laws apply tests for defining, and limiting funds to, serious 
contenders.  Typically, candidates qualify either by (i) raising a 
threshold amount of money from a requisite number of donors with, 
typically, the size of the contribution that counts toward qualification 
capped at a relatively small amount; (ii) winning a party nomination; 
or (iii) winning a certain percentage of the vote in the election.  The 
primary component of the presidential public funding system uses the 
first method—qualification by raising a certain number of small 
donations.  This is also the dominant form of qualification in most 
state and local systems.  The presidential general election public 
funding program combines the second and third criteria—major party 
nominees, and nominees of minor parties that received more than five 
percent of the vote in the preceding presidential election receive funds 
upon nomination; while new party, smaller minor party, and 
independent candidates qualify for post-election funding if they 
receive a threshold percentage of the vote. 
D.  Partial or Full Funding? 
The presidential general election public funding program is 
unusual in that it is intended to provide participating candidates with 
full public funding, although that goal has been effectively 
undermined by the creative development and exploitation of 
loopholes in the law.  State and local “clean money” programs, such 
as those in Maine and Arizona, are also aimed at eliminating any role 
for private funds once a candidate qualifies for public funds by raising 
a specified amount of small, private donations.  A qualifying 
candidate is given a flat grant intended to cover the cost of the rest of 
the campaign, and the candidate agrees not to accept any private 
funds after taking the public grant.  Other public funding programs 
provide only partial public funding.  Under small-donor matching 
systems, candidates qualify for funding by raising a threshold amount 
of small donations and then receive public funds that match 
subsequent small private contributions.  The match can be a multiple 
of the small private donation; New York City, for example, matches 
donations of up to $175 at a rate of six-to-one, up to a ceiling.  In 
small-donor matching systems, candidates may also be able to accept 
larger, nonmatchable contributions, subject to the jurisdiction’s 
general contribution limit. 
Whether a program is partial or full applies only to an individual 
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candidate’s campaign funds.  Under Buckley v. Valeo,11 there cannot 
be mandatory full public funding of an entire election campaign, nor 
can the decision of one candidate to take public funding affect the 
freedom of other campaign participants to use private funds.  
Individual candidates are always free to choose not to take public 
funding and instead rely on private contributions, or their own 
personal wealth.  So, too, political parties and politically active 
organizations and individuals are free to fund independent spending 
that supports or opposes publicly-funded candidates. 
E.  Spending Limits 
Spending limits are inherent in a full public funding program.  If 
the public grant is intended to fully replace private funds, then the 
amount of the grant automatically becomes a spending limit.  
Spending limits are not logically entailed in partial public funding 
programs.  The public grant could operate as a floor, with candidates 
permitted to raise and spend as much as they want in private 
donations (presumably with dollar limits on the size of the donations).  
But all American public funding programs that make payments to 
candidates, including those that provide only partial public funding, 
come with a spending limit. (The handful of programs that provide 
grants to political parties do not have spending limits, but these 
usually involve very small grants which are clearly supplementary to 
privately raised funds.)  Indeed, for many people, part of public 
funding’s appeal has been that it provides a means of getting 
candidates to agree to a spending limit.  Again, of course, as much as 
a candidate’s decision to take public funding cannot affect the use of 
private funds by other candidates, the spending limit does not apply to 
nonparticipating candidates or other campaign actors. 
F.  Source of Funds 
A curious feature of many American public funding programs is 
that they rely on an unusual source of funds—the taxpayer checkoff.  
The presidential public funding program set the pattern.  The money 
from the program is derived from taxes paid by those taxpayers who 
choose to dedicate a portion of their tax liability—initially one dollar 
for a single filer and two dollars for a couple, and now three dollars 
and six dollars—to the program.  Many states similarly rely on the 
11.  424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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taxpayer checkoff.  Other states, and nearly all the local governments 
that have adopted public funding, rely on general revenues or specific 
earmarked fees and fines, not the checkoff. 
IV.  PUBLIC FUNDING AND THE SUPREME COURT 
Of all the forms of campaign finance regulation, public funding 
presents the least constitutional difficulty.  In Buckley v. Valeo, the 
Supreme Court held that public financing of election campaigns falls 
within Congress’s power under the General Welfare Clause.12  The 
Court determined that Congress could find public financing advances 
three goals: reducing “the deleterious influence of large contributions 
on our political process,” “facilitat[ing] communication by candidates 
with the electorate,” and “free[ing] candidates from the rigors of 
fundraising.”13  As the Court further observed, “[i]t cannot be 
gainsaid that public financing as a means of eliminating the improper 
influence of large private contributions furthers a significant 
government interest.”14  The Court also noted that public funding 
fitted well with a program of limiting private contributions.  As 
contribution limits “necessarily increase the burden of fundraising,” 
Congress could “properly regard[]” public financing as an appropriate 
means of relieving candidates from the “rigors of soliciting private 
contributions.”15  The Court summarily rejected the argument that 
giving public money to candidates and parties violates the First 
Amendment “by analogy” to the First Amendment’s “no-
establishment” clause for religion.16  So, too, it dismissed the 
assertion that public funding would “lead to governmental control of 
the internal affairs of political parties, and thus to a significant loss of 
political freedom.”17  The Court found the public funding program did 
“not abridge, restrict or censor speech” but instead “use[d] public 
money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in 
the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people.”18  In 
short, public funding advances First Amendment values. 
Buckley also upheld two specific, and basic, components of the 
12.  Id. at 90–91. 
13.  Id. at 91. 
14.  Id. at 96. 
15.  Id. 
16.  See id. at 92. 
17.  Id. at 93 n.126. 
18.  Id. at 92–93. 
 
49-4, BRIFFAULT, ME FORMAT.DOC 2/17/2014  5:24 PM 
530 WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW [49:521 
presidential public funding program: conditioning the grant of public 
funds on a candidate’s acceptance of a spending limit; and the 
statutory formulas for determining which candidates are eligible to 
receive public funds and how much they can receive.  Although 
Buckley struck down spending limits on candidates and independent 
groups, it easily upheld the spending limits that accompany 
presidential public funding.  In a two-sentence footnote, the Court 
simply asserted:  
 
Congress may engage in public financing of election campaigns 
and may condition acceptance of public funds on an agreement by 
the candidate to abide by specified expenditure limitations.  Just as 
a candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the contributions he 
chooses to accept, he may decide to forgo private fundraising and 
accept public funding.19 
 
The Court gave more attention to the claim that the formulas for 
determining eligibility for, and the size of, the public grant 
discriminated against minor parties, independents, and, in the 
primaries, candidates with lesser fundraising abilities.  But the Court 
rejected this constitutional challenge.  The Court found that Congress 
could differentiate among candidates so as not to “fund[] hopeless 
candidacies with large sums of public money” or provide public 
assistance to “candidates without significant public support.”20 
The Supreme Court has considered public funding questions 
only three times since Buckley.  The first two cases, decided in the 
first decade after Buckley, involved the presidential public funding 
law.  In Republican National Committee v. FEC (RNC ),21 the Court 
summarily affirmed a three-judge court decision rejecting the claims 
that in practice—as evidenced in the 1976 campaign—candidates 
were coerced into accepting public funding so that the candidate 
spending limit was unconstitutional, and that the provision of the 
presidential public funding law restricting coordinated spending by a 
party whose candidate accepted public funding violated the party’s 
First Amendment rights.22  In FEC v. National Conservative Political 
19.  Id. at 57 n.65. 
20.  Id. at 96. 
21.  445 U.S. 955 (1980). 
22.  See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
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Action Committee (NCPAC  ),23 the Court invalidated the provision 
of the presidential public funding law limiting independent 
expenditures in support of or in opposition to a publicly-funded 
presidential candidate to $1,000.  Buckley had held unconstitutional 
the general limit on independent spending, but had not specifically 
addressed the independent spending limit in the presidential public 
funding law.  Taking Buckley, RNC, and NCPAC together, a 
candidate’s receipt of public funding can be conditioned on his 
acceptance of a spending limit and his party limiting its coordinated 
expenditures, but the provision of public funding—and a candidate’s 
acceptance of public funding—has no impact on the rights of 
independent spenders. 
The third major case—decided in 2011—is Arizona Free 
Enterprise,24 which dealt with the so-called “trigger” provision of 
Arizona’s public funding law.  Although not part of the presidential 
public funding law, trigger provisions—also known as “fair fight” or 
“rescue” funds—became a common part of many state and local 
public funding laws, starting in the 1990s.  Under a trigger law, 
spending by privately-funded candidates who have declined public 
funding or by independent committees concerning a publicly-funded 
candidate can “trigger” a change in the rules governing a publicly-
funded candidate.  If the nonparticipating candidate spends more than 
the spending limit for the publicly-funded candidate—or if the 
combination of nonparticipant spending and supportive independent 
spending rises above that ceiling—something happens.  Either the 
state will provide the publicly-funded candidate with additional funds 
up to some new, higher limit, or the publicly-funded candidate would 
be free to solicit and spend additional private funds. 
Trigger laws reflect two concerns that developed as experience 
with public funding increased.  First, candidates may be reluctant to 
accept public funding with a spending limit because their 
opponents—with or without the support of independent committees—
are not subject to limits and can, thus, outspend them.  The extent of 
this concern may depend on the size of the public grant relative to the 
cost of an effective campaign, as well as the resources available to the 
candidate’s opponent.  From the perspective of the publicly-funded 
candidate, if the public funds are much less than the money being 
spent against her, the spending limit becomes a form of unilateral 
23.  470 U.S. 480 (1985). 
24.  Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
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disarmament.  The trigger funds—or even simply release from the 
spending limit with permission to raise additional private 
contributions—alleviate that concern and make public funding more 
attractive to candidates.  Second, “it is exceedingly difficult to get the 
level of public subsidy right.”25  Although the standard public funding 
grant or match level may be adequate for most races in a jurisdiction, 
in any given year the election in a particular race or district may be 
especially hotly contested.  It would be impossible to determine in 
advance which specific elections in a particular election year will be 
more competitive than others, and it would be wasteful to pump more 
public funds into all elections just to ensure that more money is 
available in those elections where it is most needed.  On the other 
hand, too small a grant would discourage participation in the program.  
High levels of spending by other campaign actors—nonparticipating 
candidates and independent committees—are an excellent marker of 
which elections are especially competitive.  Triggers provide 
desirable flexibility by allowing the level of public funding, or the 
mix of public and private funds, to respond to the conditions of 
specific elections. 
Prior to 2010, all but one of the lower federal courts that had 
heard challenges to state trigger laws had sustained the trigger 
provisions, finding the laws promote rather than burden campaign 
speech and are justified by the state’s interest in making public 
funding effective and attractive to candidates.  On the first point, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explained, in 
upholding the trigger provision of Maine’s clean money law in 
Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and Practices,26 that 
nonparticipating candidates and committees “have no right to speak 
free from response.”27  Indeed, the court rejected the very idea “which 
equates responsive speech with an impairment to the initial 
speaker.”28  Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in North Carolina Right to 
Life v. Leake 29 agreed that responsive funds do not impinge on First 
Amendment rights, as nonparticipating candidates and independent 
25.  Stephen Ansolabehere, Arizona Free Enterprise v Bennett and the Problem of 
Campaign Finance, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 53–54. 
26.  205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding provision providing up to double the initial 
distribution of public funds). 
27.  Id. at 464. 
28.  Id. at 465. 
29.  524 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2008) (upholding trigger funds equal to two times the trigger 
threshold). 
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committees “remain free to raise and spend as much money, and 
engage in as much political speech, as they desire.  They will not be 
jailed, fined, or censured if they exceed trigger amounts.”30  The 
distribution of additional public funds to their opponents triggered by 
their actions “‘furthers, not abridges pertinent First Amendment 
values’ by ensuring that the participating candidate will have an 
opportunity to engage in responsive speech.”31 
On the second point, these courts recognized that many 
candidates are unlikely to accept public funding with its spending 
limit unless there is some kind of escape hatch enabling them to 
respond to high levels of spending by nonparticipating opponents or 
independent committees.  As the Eighth Circuit explained: 
 
[T]his provision removes the disincentive a candidate may have to 
participate in the public financing system because of the 
candidate’s fear of being grossly outspent by a well-financed, 
privately funded opponent.  Absent such a safeguard, the State 
could reasonably believe that far fewer candidates would enroll in 
its campaign-financing program, with its binding limitation on 
campaign expenditures, because of the candidates’ concerns of 
placing their candidacy at an insurmountable disadvantage.32 
 
Other courts agreed that “[t]he provision prevents the publicly-funded 
candidate from being penalized for deciding to accept public funds.”33 
 In Arizona Free Enterprise, however, a five-justice majority of 
the Supreme Court rejected this reasoning.  In an opinion by Chief 
Justice Roberts, the Court found that providing additional public 
funds to candidates as a response to high levels of spending by 
privately-funded candidates or independent committees does burden 
the speech of those candidates and committees by operating as a 
30.  Id. at 437. 
31.  Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92–93 (1976)). 
32.  Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1554 (8th Cir. 1996). 
33.  Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916, 928 (W.D. Ky. 1995).  Other decisions in this 
period upholding trigger fund laws include Ass’n of American Physicians & Surgeons v. 
Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Ariz. 2005) and Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 537 F. 
Supp. 2d 359 (D. Conn. 2008).  The one case before 2010 that went the other way was Day v. 
Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994), which struck down a Minnesota law that both raised 
the spending limit and increased the public funding allotment for a candidate targeted by 
opposing independent expenditures.  Day was subsequently distinguished by the same court in 
Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1555, and as a result was considered to be of dubious precedential 
value by other courts. See Daggett, 205 F.3d at 464 n.25; Leake, 524 F.3d at 438. 
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penalty for spending above the trigger threshold.34 
 
Once a privately financed candidate has raised or spent more 
than the State’s initial grant to a publicly financed candidate, each 
personal dollar spent by the privately financed candidate results in 
an award of almost one additional dollar to his opponent.  That 
plainly forces the privately financed candidate to ‘shoulder a 
special and potentially significant burden’ when choosing to 
exercise his First Amendment right to spend funds on behalf of his 
candidacy.35 
 
Similarly, for the independent committee, 
 
[j]ust as with the candidate the independent group supports, the 
more money spent on that candidate’s behalf or in opposition to a 
publicly funded candidate, the more money the publicly funded 
candidate receives from the State . . . .  [T]he effect of a dollar 
spent on election speech is a guaranteed financial payout to the 
publicly funded candidate the group opposes.36 
 
Even if the trigger funds “result in more speech by publicly-funded 
candidates and more speech in general,” that still burdens the speech 
of privately-funded candidates and independent groups.37  For the 
Roberts Court, this smacked too much of the equalization of 
campaign speech that Buckley had rejected as a justification for 
spending limits.38 
Having determined that trigger funds operate as a burden on 
speech, the Court found that burden could not be justified by the 
state’s interest in promoting its public funding program.  The Court 
emphasized that the core constitutional interest justifying campaign 
34.  Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2818–19 
(2011).  In so concluding, the Court relied heavily on its 2008 decision in Davis v. FEC, 554 
U.S. 724 (2008), striking down the Millionaires’ Amendment provision of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002. See Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2817–24.  Indeed, after 
Davis, two courts of appeals concluded that trigger laws were unconstitutional. See Green 
Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2010); Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279 (11th 
Cir. 2010). 
35.  Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2818. 
36.  Id. at 2819. 
37.  Id. at 2821. 
38.  Id. at 2820–21.  Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion was joined by Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.  Justice Kagan wrote the dissenting opinion joined by 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. 
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finance restrictions is the prevention of corruption and the appearance 
of corruption.  While public funding can advance that interest, and 
trigger funds “might well promote participation in public funding,” 
that served the state’s anti-corruption interest only “indirectly” and 
was inadequate to justify the burden on political speech resulting from 
the provision of trigger funds.39 
V.  PUBLIC FUNDING AFTER ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE 
Arizona Free Enterprise has had an immediate impact on state 
public funding laws.  The trigger provisions in Maine’s clean money 
law40 and West Virginia’s pilot public funding program for judicial 
elections41 have already been invalidated, and, due to lack of 
severability, the entire Nebraska public funding law has been struck 
down because of its trigger provision.42  The trigger fund provisions 
in the Connecticut and Florida public funding laws had already been 
invalidated as Arizona Free Enterprise was making its way to the 
Supreme Court.43  Without the availability of the trigger fund 
mechanism, it will surely be more difficult to get public funding 
adopted or to persuade elected officials to take public funding when it 
is available.  The inclusion of trigger mechanisms in many of the state 
public funding laws adopted in the past decade—including Arizona, 
Connecticut, Maine, and North Carolina—reflect the practical 
recognition that with nonparticipating candidates and independent 
committees potentially able to raise and spend funds without limit, a 
candidate who accepts limited public funds plus a spending limit risks 
putting herself at a competitive disadvantage. 
Still, Arizona Free Enterprise need not and should not mean the 
end of public funding.  First, it is not clear that Arizona Free 
Enterprise dooms all trigger mechanisms.  Although states and local 
governments may not be able to provide more public funds in 
response to private spending, they might still be able to respond to 
high levels of private spending by lifting spending limits, and 
allowing publicly-funded candidates to raise and spend private funds.  
To be sure, that would be a response to spending by another candidate 
39.  Id. at 2826–28. 
40.  See Cushing v. McKee, 853 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D. Me. 2012). 
41.  State ex rel Loughry v. Tennant, 732 S.E.2d 507, 518 (W. Va. 2012). 
42.  State ex rel Bruning v. Gale, 817 N.W.2d 768, 784 (Neb. 2012). 
43.  See Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2010); Scott v. Roberts, 
612 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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or a committee and so arguably a “penalty” for the other spender, but 
the response would not involve the provision of any public funds—
which was a sore point in the Court’s assessment of Arizona’s law.44  
Nor would the state be discriminating against privately-funded 
candidates as long as the contribution limit for donations to the 
publicly-funded candidate is not higher than the limits on donations to 
privately-funded candidates.45 
A second option, particularly for flat grant or clean money 
programs, would be to provide a much larger public grant to 
qualifying candidates.  The larger grant, which might very well be a 
good idea in its own right—the presidential public grant is far, far less 
than the cost of contemporary presidential election campaigns—
would provide candidates with an assurance of adequate funding.  
Indeed, unlike trigger funds, the larger grant would be both 
guaranteed and available to the publicly-funded candidate at the 
outset of the campaign, and thus far more useful to a candidate than 
trigger funds, which may come very late in the election cycle.  
Indeed, there is some evidence from Arizona of privately-funded 
candidates timing their expenditures so late in the election as to make 
it difficult for publicly-funded candidates to actually get the trigger 
funds in a timely way.  But the availability of a very large grant also 
has the potential for wasting money unnecessarily in noncompetitive 
races.  This could be addressed by conditioning the grant on the 
presence of well-funded opponents, or by requiring candidates to 
return unused funds at the end of the campaign—although it’s not 
clear what incentive the candidate would have to be frugal.  In any 
event, a more generous grant is likely to increase political resistance 
to the program and make public funding more difficult to attain. 
VI.  AN ARGUMENT FOR PUBLIC FUNDING WITHOUT SPENDING LIMITS 
A third option is to eliminate spending limits from public 
funding programs altogether.  The justifications for a spending limit 
are: (i) that it equalizes the resources available to competing 
candidates and, thus, promotes fair competition; and (ii) that it holds 
down the amount of money spent in an election.  Moreover, in a full 
public funding system, like the presidential general election public 
44.  Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2818–19. 
45.  That distinguishes this proposal from the law struck down in Davis v. FEC, 554 
U.S. 728 (2008), which raised the contribution limit for a candidate whose opponent 
contributed a large amount of personal funds to his campaign. 
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funding program or state clean money systems, the spending limit is 
built into the idea of full public funding, as the candidate can only 
spend as much as the state provides him.  Full public funding plus a 
spending limit is also intended to eliminate (iii) the burden of fund-
raising on candidates and (iv) the special influence that large donors 
can obtain over elections and the behavior of elected officials grateful 
for or dependent on their donations.  Without a spending limit, and 
with, after Arizona Free Enterprise, the additional sums necessarily 
raised by private contributions, these goals are arguably unattainable. 
But the first of these goals—reduction of total spending—should 
not be a campaign finance reform objective at all, and the second 
goal—equalization of resources for candidates—is unattainable under 
current constitutional doctrine.  The third and fourth goals—reduction 
of special interest influence and amelioration of the burdens of 
fundraising—are both desirable and constitutionally attainable, but 
they can be advanced without spending limits. 
Although commentators regularly decry the cost of election 
campaigns, arguing for a reduction in total spending is a 
fundamentally mistaken objection to our current campaign finance 
system.  Election expenditures consist of communications and voter 
mobilization activities—efforts to present facts, arguments, other 
information to the voters, and to facilitate their participation in 
elections.  These efforts advance our democratic system.  The 
problems with our campaign finance system relate to the uneven 
resources across candidates and the influence of large donors on 
elections and governance, not the level of spending per se. 
With respect to the unequal resources of candidates, current 
constitutional doctrine makes equalization impossible.  So long as 
spending limits on candidates and independent groups, limits on the 
use of candidate personal wealth, and trigger funds are 
unconstitutional, candidate equalization is unattainable.  To be sure, 
public funding can promote some equalization by leveling up, that is, 
by providing public funds to qualifying candidates who have only 
limited access to private resources (particularly, challengers and 
political newcomers).  The public grant can, thus, provide a measure 
of equality by enabling underfunded candidates to get their campaigns 
off the ground.  In many elections, providing such public funding 
functions as a kind of seed money that may enable a candidate to run 
a competitive campaign against a better-funded opponent.  But under 
current constitutional doctrine true equalization of campaign funding 
is impossible and, thus, needs to be dropped from the goals of 
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campaign finance reform. 
That leaves reduction of special interest influence and the 
amelioration of the burdens of fundraising.  Public funding, even 
without spending limits, can still advance those goals, even if their 
complete achievement is unattainable.  The provision of some public 
funds will, to that extent, make the pursuit of large private donations 
less necessary and large donors less influential.  The design of the 
public funding system can promote these goals, even without a 
spending limit.  In a flat grant system, the larger the initial public 
grant, the less the need for and the less the dependence on private 
donations.  In a matching grant system, the greater the match ratio—
such as 4:1, 5:1, or 6:1 for small donations of, say, under $200—the 
less the dependence on large donations and the less the influence of 
large donors.  Certainly, such a small donor leveraged-match system 
may be said to increase the time burden of fundraising.  But small-
donor fundraising differs in its form and its target from the “dialing 
for dollars” or big-ticket fundraising events central to the private 
fundraising system.  With candidates having to reach out to, contact, 
and respond to a much larger number of smaller givers, small-donor 
fundraising resembles campaigning more than traditional fund-
raising.  Indeed, there is evidence that New York City, which has the 
most generous match and caps matchable donations at the relatively 
low level of $175, has not only many more small donors, but the 
donors to publicly-funded candidates are far more racially, 
economically, and socially diverse than donors to nonparticipating 
candidates.46  To the extent that fundraising involves widespread 
contact with broader elements of the public, it approaches 
campaigning, and is no more objectionable than campaigning itself. 
Of course, the elimination of spending limits means the end of 
the idea of full public funding.  But full public funding was an illusion 
anyway.  The system was never fully publicly funded as long as 
candidates are free to not participate, and independent committees and 
individuals can spend as much as they want in private funds in 
support of or in opposition to candidates—including publicly-funded 
candidates. 
The future of public funding is likely to consist either of small 
donor matching programs, like New York City’s, or so-called hybrid 
46.  See Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Brusoe, & Brendan Glavin, Small Donors, Big 
Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States, 11 
ELECTION L.J. 3 (2012). 
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systems in which candidates get a base amount in a flat grant but can 
participate in competitive races by raising additional, matchable, 
small donations.  Pure flat grant systems are simply unable to respond 
to competitive elections without very large initial grants, and small 
donor matching programs have the additional appeal of providing an 
incentive to candidates to seek the participation of small donors.  Still, 
as long as these programs include spending limits, there is the 
possibility that they will be inadequate to competitive races and 
disadvantage public-funding participants. 
My suggestion would be to scrap spending limits completely.  
Public funding would still enable candidates without personal wealth, 
wealthy backers, or access to special interest financial support to 
mount campaigns.  With small donor matches, the candidates who are 
better at raising small donations, which presumably reflects some 
popular appeal, would be able to mount increasingly well-funded 
campaigns.  In theory, the state or city could keep on matching—
presumably at a decreased ratio—as long as the candidate keeps 
raising funds.  More likely, at some point, the jurisdiction could 
decide the public has helped the candidate enough, and stop providing 
the candidate with more money, but let him continue to raise (subject 
to standard contribution limits) and spend private money if he deems 
that necessary.  Such a system of public funding without limits would 
lower barriers to entry and boost challengers, political outsiders, and 
candidates without personal wealth or wealthy backers—and reduce 
the role of large donors in the system—without curbing the ability of 
publicly supported candidates to respond to unlimited spending by 
other candidates or independent groups.  Public funding under this 
system would also be available to incumbents and candidates with 
access to larger donors.  But if they want to participate in this 
system—and be less dependent on large donors—so much the better. 
Given our campaign finance jurisprudence, our system will 
inevitably be at least to some degree privately-funded.  Public funding 
laws can supplement and complement private funds—by making it 
easier for candidates without personal wealth or support from large 
donors to run, and by encouraging candidates to pursue small 
donations—and in so doing these laws can promote fair competition 
among candidates, increase political speech and participation, and 
reduce the role of large private wealth.  But public funding cannot 
replace private funds.  That being the case, we need to think about the 
rules that promote the best combination of public and private funding.  
Spending limits handicap publicly-funded candidates without 
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advancing any of the attainable and desirable goals of public funding.  
For that reason, eliminating spending limits would make public 
funding more attractive to candidates and more effective at attaining 
the goals of campaign finance reform. 
